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“A FRESH LOOK”: TITLE VII’S NEW PROMISE FOR LGBT
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION POST-HIVELY†
ABSTRACT
While about half of the states have passed antidiscrimination statutes that
protect against sexual orientation discrimination, in the other half LGBT
individuals face threats to their livelihoods and their dignity simply for being
who they are. The U.S. Supreme Court does not recognize LGBT status as a
class subject to heightened scrutiny and legislative efforts to pass nationwide
discrimination protections for LGBT individuals, including an attempted
amendment to the Civil Rights Act, have been unsuccessful. Further, until 2017,
every federal circuit held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting
employment discrimination based on sex, did not include protection against
sexual orientation discrimination. However, the Seventh Circuit took a “fresh
look” at Title VII and recently reversed course, holding in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College that Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to
sexual orientation discrimination, perhaps paving the way for national
employment discrimination protection for LGBT individuals.
While the Hively decision demonstrates Title VII’s promise as a strong
method for achieving national LGBT employment protections, some
commentators believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
allowing certain private employers to assert statutory religious freedom claims
would allow private employers to seek religious exemptions to Title VII’s sexual
orientation protections. This Comment argues, however, that such claims will
likely be unsuccessful because Title VII meets the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act’s strict scrutiny standard. Further, reliance on Title VII
provides other advantages including obviating the need for LGBT individuals to
rely on nonuniform state and local protections and the possibility that federal
courts may expand Hively’s rationale to other federal statutes prohibiting sex
discrimination.
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of Title VII serves as the best defense against sexual orientation discrimination
even in the face of religious objection and that litigants should focus on
expanding the Hively rationales to other federal circuits to develop more
contemporary opinions and possibly greater consensus before the Supreme
Court ultimately resolves the issue.
†

This Comment received the Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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INTRODUCTION
“Every single American[—]gay, straight, lesbian, bisexual,
transgender[—]every single American deserves to be treated equally
in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of our society. It’s a pretty simple
proposition.”
—President Barack Obama1

In 2009, Kimberly Hively, an adjunct instructor at Ivy Tech Community
College in Indiana for fourteen years, kissed her girlfriend goodbye in the
campus parking lot before work.2 The next day, she was reprimanded for
unprofessionalism.3 For the next four years, despite her substantial qualifications
and the fact that she had never received a negative review, she was consistently
denied promotions, was never granted a single interview for the six full-time
positions she applied for, and ultimately lost her teaching position in 2014.4 She
filed a pro se complaint with the EEOC and a pro se complaint to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, charging the college with
discriminating against her for being a lesbian.5 However, she faced an uphill
battle—neither federal law nor Indiana law prevented the college from
discriminating against her because of her sexual orientation.6 Hively’s
experience is not an isolated one—over a quarter of LGBT employees
nationwide report experiencing discrimination or harassment in the workplace
and nearly half of the LGBT population lives in areas where they can be
discriminated against for simply being who they are.7
LGBT rights have expanded significantly over the past decade; however,
employment discrimination against LGBT people remains a pervasive and
widespread national problem.8 Although twenty-two states have passed or

1

President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Human Rights Campaign’s Annual National Dinner (Oct. 1,

2011).
2
Darran Simon, Lesbian Plaintiff in Work Discrimination Suit Sticking to Fight, CNN (Apr. 5, 2017,
4:34 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/05/us/lgbt-employees-appeals-court-plaintiff/index.html.
3
Id.
4
Camille Patti, Note, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle but Winning the War
for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133, 135 (2017).
5
Id.; see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 853
F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
6
Patti, supra note 4; Hively, 830 F.3d at 714.
7
See Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT People: Existence and
Impact, in BLOOMBERG BNA, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 40-3 (Christine Michelle Duffy ed., 2014); Non-Discrimination Laws,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last
visited Mar. 26, 2019).
8
Sears & Mallory, supra note 7.
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amended state civil rights or employment statutes to prohibit LGBT
discrimination, in twenty-eight states, a gay person can get “married on Saturday
and then fired on Monday for just that act.”9 The prevalence of such
discrimination and its negative impacts on LGBT people has been recognized
and documented by courts; in complaints to administrative agencies; and in
newspapers, books, and other media.10 Still, while Congress has attempted
several times to provide employment discrimination protections for LGBT
people, it has ultimately been unsuccessful.11
Employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity is widespread and poses significant physical and psychological harm to
LGBT individuals.12 One national survey found that 42% of LGB-identified
individuals had experienced at least one form of employment discrimination
because of their sexual orientation13 and another found that 78% of transgender
individuals had experienced workplace discrimination.14 This discrimination
can lead to harmful personal effects on LGBT individuals and overall wage and
employment disparities.15 Fear of discrimination may lead LGBT employees to
conceal their sexual or gender identities leading to less job satisfaction, less trust
among fellow employees, and even physical symptoms of stress and isolation.16
Those who have experienced discrimination firsthand report greater rates of
absenteeism and mental health issues like depression.17 Further, studies show
gay men are paid less on average than their straight peers and transgender
individuals face significantly higher unemployment rates and poverty rates than
all groups surveyed.18 Because discrimination has such a proven negative impact
on LGBT individuals, ensuring that all LGBT employees are protected by
legislation should be a serious policy rationale for expanding antidiscrimination
protections.

9
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017); see Hively, 830 F.3d at 714 n.6;
Moira Donegan, Jeff Sessions Wants to Make Sure that You Can Be Fired for Being Gay, NEW REPUBLIC (Jul.
27, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/144081/jeff-sessions-wants-make-sure-can-fired-gay.
10
See Sears & Mallory, supra note 7.
11
Patti, supra note 4.
12
See BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
& ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 1–2 (2011), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/SearsMallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf.
13
Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 2.
15
Id. at 13–14.
16
Id. at 13.
17
Id. at 15–16.
18
Id. at 14.
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In response to these disparities and Congress’s repeated failure to act on
employment discrimination against LGBT people, activists and legal scholars
have been left to shoulder the daunting task of putting forth arguments for
workplace protection absent express statutory authority.19 For decades, LGBT
litigants have consistently argued, and federal courts of appeals have
consistently rejected, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits sexual
orientation employment discrimination pursuant to its protections against sex
discrimination in the workplace.20 Indeed, until 2017, every federal circuit had
ruled expressly that sexual orientation is not included in the discrimination
protections of Title VII—until the Seventh Circuit’s recent en banc decision in
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College.21
In Hively, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, took “a fresh look” at the
statute and held that Title VII’s prohibition against “sex discrimination”
encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.22 This interpretation follows a
similar reading of Title VII by the EEOC in 2015.23 The Hively decision creates
a circuit split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals that the U.S. Supreme Court
has yet to resolve. Soon after Hively, the Second Circuit sitting en banc in Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc.24 similarly held that Title VII expressly prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination for the same rationales.25 Given Hively’s persuasive
reasoning and the possibility that the Supreme Court will interpret Title VII in a
similar manner, it is important to understand the implications of the Supreme
Court reading sexual orientation into Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition
in terms of its effect on other federal statutes and potential challenges that may
ensue.

19
Such possible solutions have included relying on state antidiscrimination laws, drafting new federal
legislation, and pushing for heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. See J. Banning Jasiunas,
Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate but Equal” Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians
from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1530 (2000).
20
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle,
67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1134 (2015); see Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017);
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,
261 (3d Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Hopkins v.
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir. 1996); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. FLRA, 964 F.2d
1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
21
853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017); cases cited supra note 20.
22
Hively, 853 F.3d at 340–41.
23
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 15, 2015).
24
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
25
See id. at 108.
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One set of such challenges is likely to arise in the form of claims by private
employers seeking exemptions from the application of Title VII to sexual
orientation employment discrimination claims on the basis of religious
objection. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) initially
allowed individuals to be exempted from federal laws that substantially burden
the free exercise of religion subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.26 In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that private, closely held, for-profit
business corporations, too, are protected by RFRA and may be exempted from
federal laws that substantially burden the corporation’s sincerely held religious
beliefs, provided the law is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.27 Since LGBT discrimination is often based on religion,
it is not hard to imagine, then, that a private corporation asserting a sincerely
held religious objection to LGBT status may attempt to use RFRA to be
exempted from Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition. Were such an
exception granted, Title VII’s workplace protections for LGBT employees could
be seriously undermined on a practical level.
This Comment argues, however, that both the Supreme Court’s language in
Hobby Lobby and other Supreme Court precedent suggest that Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision would ultimately pass the strict scrutiny analysis
required under RFRA. Thus, an interpretation that Title VII prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination serves as the best avenue for securing nationwide
employment discrimination protection for LGBT people even in the face of
religious objection. Additionally, courts could—and should—extend the
reasoning of Hively to other federal statutes prohibiting sex discrimination,
potentially providing sweeping antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people.
This Comment argues that expansion of Title VII based on the rationales set
forth in Hively would pave the way for broad antidiscrimination protections even
in the face of religious objection because Title VII meets the strict scrutiny
standard required under RFRA. Part I discusses the histories of RFRA and Title
VII by tracing their legislative histories and development through case law to
examine how the statutes may interact with one another. Part II consolidates
these concurrent histories to make three main arguments: first, Title VII meets

26
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012); see Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1139 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, No. 14-12696-CC, 2016 WL
11503064, at *1–2 (11th Cir. May 31, 2016). Additionally, nonprofit, religious organizations such as churches
and parochial schools have historically been given “special solicitude” under the First Amendment’s free
exercise protections. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012).
27
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761, 2768, 2775, 2791 (2014).
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the strict scrutiny analysis required by RFRA; second, Title VII obviates the
need for LGBT individuals to rely on nonuniform laws and policies; and third,
the rationales behind protecting sexual orientation under Title VII extend to
other federal statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. Finally, Part III argues that
since the Supreme Court has affirmatively decided to not yet resolve the circuit
split created by Hively,28 litigants should focus on expanding Hively’s rationales
to other federal circuits by applying Hively’s rationales to existing circuit
precedent.
I.

THE HISTORIES OF RFRA AND TITLE VII

Examining the histories of RFRA and Title VII is necessary to understanding
how the statutes may interact with one another. RFRA was drafted and passed
in response to the development of the Supreme Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence, particularly as a strong response to the Supreme Court’s
weakening of constitutional protection for religious freedom in Employment
Division v. Smith.29 The Supreme Court later expanded RFRA’s scope in Hobby
Lobby to allow private, for-profit businesses to assert RFRA claims.30 Similarly,
although Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition initially lacked robust force,
Supreme Court precedent expanding its scope led to its coverage of a broad
range of situations.31 This broader scope informed the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Hively holding that Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition includes
protection against sexual orientation discrimination.32
Section A below briefly examines the history of the Supreme Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence culminating in the passage of RFRA. It then highlights
one of the most recent and important RFRA developments in the Court’s Hobby
Lobby decision. Section B next traces the history of Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition particularly through Supreme Court case law
expanding its scope. Section B concludes by discussing how this more robust
reading of Title VII led the Seventh Circuit in Hively to find two separate

28
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557, 557 (2017) (mem.) (denying certiorari from an Eleventh
Circuit case holding that Title VII does not protect against sexual orientation discrimination).
29
Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative
History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531, 531 (1993); see Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
30
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761, 2768, 2775, 2791.
31
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017); see Robert C. Bird, More than a
Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 140–41 (1997) (Title VII’s absence of legislative history allowed the
Supreme Court to broaden its protections).
32
Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52.
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rationales for interpreting the sex discrimination prohibition to protect against
sexual orientation discrimination.
A. Free Exercise Jurisprudence, RFRA, and Hobby Lobby
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence has historically been
punctuated by three shifting standards of review.33 During the Supreme Court’s
first half-century of analyzing free exercise claims after 1879, it applied rational
basis review to claims challenging laws that burdened free exercise, yielding no
religious exemptions to general laws.34 Then, beginning with Cantwell v.
Connecticut in 1940, the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment to
the states and began applying intermediate scrutiny to free exercise claims.35
While this standard provided heightened protection for religious freedom
claimants, in four cases in 1961 involving Sunday blue laws and Sabbath day
laws, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that individuals who recognized the
Sabbath on Saturday instead of Sunday were not entitled to exemptions from the
criminal penalties of the Sunday laws.36 These decisions sparked a serious public
response and were widely criticized as affronts to religious liberty, particularly
because the Sunday laws were obviously inspired by Christianity and
maintained Christian religious significance to the majority of individuals.37 In
1963 the Supreme Court responded to this public criticism in Sherbert v.
Verner,38 another Saturday Sabbatarian case, where it applied a strict scrutiny
standard analysis to a free exercise claim for the first time.39 The new standard
required the challenged law to serve a compelling state interest and to be
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s purpose.40 While some religious
freedom claimants won under this standard,41 the Supreme Court in several

33
See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 121 (4th ed. 2016).
34
Id. at 121–22 (describing rational basis review as “low-level scrutiny”).
35
Id. (describing intermediate scrutiny as “heightened scrutiny” and “free exercise scrutiny”).
36
Id. at 206; see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 624, 630 (1961).
37
WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 206.
38
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
39
Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1709, 1714–15 (2000) (noting
that Sherbert is the first time the Supreme Court invalidated a government regulation solely based on the Free
Exercise Clause, applying a strict scrutiny standard); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–08; WITTE, JR. &
NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 206.
40
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; see also WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 206 (describing the
use of strict scrutiny in the Sherbert decision).
41
See Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1987) (noting that the government
violated the Sherbert standard when it denied unemployment benefits to an employee who was dismissed for
refusing to work certain shifts due to religious reasons); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228–29 (1972)

SHERRELL_5.21.2019_PUBLICATION COPY

2019]

TITLE VII’S NEW PROMISE

5/21/2019 2:49 PM

1109

different cases either applied a lower standard of review than Sherbert or held
that Sherbert did not apply to certain government actions, particularly in tax,
military, and prison cases.42 The Sherbert strict scrutiny standard was the
prevailing method of analysis in free exercise cases until the Supreme Court’s
decision in Employment Division v. Smith in 1990.43 In Smith, the Supreme
Court returned to a lower standard of review, holding that laws that are facially
neutral and generally applicable do not violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments even where they may burden religious practice.44 Smith was
perceived by many groups as a significant blow to religious freedom rights
because it seriously weakened constitutional protections for religious
claimants.45
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith galvanized a diverse movement of
religious groups and civil rights organizations that feared the holding constituted
a serious degradation of fundamental religious freedom rights.46 These fears
were ultimately well-founded as several lower court rulings after Smith found
that religious exemptions to various general laws were not required based on
Smith’s lower standard of review.47 Once it was clear the Supreme Court would
not reconsider Smith, several religious and civil rights organizations initiated a
legislative approach ultimately culminating in the drafting and passage of
RFRA.48
RFRA restored Sherbert’s strict scrutiny standard in religious exemption
cases.49 The statute provides that the government may burden a person’s free
(noting that the government’s compulsory school attendance law did not meet the Sherbert standard when
imposed on an Amish individual whose faith prohibited school attendance past the eighth grade).
42
Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert,
Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1180–81 (2005); see Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd.
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391–92 (1990) (noting that the Sherbert standard does not apply to a tax where
the complainant’s faith does not forbid payment of the tax); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) (noting that the Sherbert standard does not apply when a government action has an
incidental effect on a religious practice, even if it is severe); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349
(1987) (holding that a “reasonableness” test applies to prison regulations instead of the Sherbert standard);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (noting First Amendment review is more deferential to the
government over military regulations than laws designed for civilians); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–
61 (1982) (noting that the government’s imposition of social security tax meets the Sherbert standard even when
imposed on an Amish claimant whose faith forbids payment or receipt of social security benefits).
43
Drinan & Huffman, supra note 29; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990); WITTE,
JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 124.
44
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 885, 888–90.
45
Drinan & Huffman, supra note 29, at 532.
46
Id. at 531–32.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 535; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
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exercise only if it demonstrates that application of the burden serves a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.50 Congress intended the Supreme Court to “look to free exercise
cases decided prior to Smith for guidance,”51 and did not intend to “unsettle other
areas of the law.”52 Although the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to state and local government action in City of Boerne v. Flores,53 it has
consistently reaffirmed the statute’s validity as applied to federal government
action.54 Although City of Boerne prompted a number of states to pass their own
state-level religious freedom statutes applying heightened scrutiny to state laws
burdening religious exercise,55 the federal RFRA “reinstates the law as it was
prior to Smith” without creating new religious exemption rights under federal
law.56
In 2006, however, the Supreme Court applied a stricter reading of RFRA in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,57 arguably going
beyond the Sherbert standard in holding that the government must justify its
actions in relation to the individual claimant.58 And while initially RFRA’s
protections covered only individuals and religious organizations in the practice
of their religion,59 the Supreme Court later in Hobby Lobby, largely relying on
Gonzales, held that RFRA also protects the free exercise rights of private, forprofit, close corporations.60 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby
Lobby noted her fear that the decision could allow private employers to engage
in discrimination by claiming it is required by the convictions of their faith.61 In
response, the Supreme Court stated that while RFRA and modern corporate law
allow for “the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’ religious
50

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8
(1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898).
52
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1902).
53
521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power did
not enable Congress to determine what actions constitute violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, a role
exclusively occupied by the Judiciary. Id. at 519–20.
54
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751; Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
55
See infra Section II.B.
56
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791.
57
546 U.S. at 439.
58
Id. at 430.
59
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000a-1 (2012); see, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 432, 434, 437–39 (church
asserted cognizable RFRA exemption claim); Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103, 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2006)
(same).
60
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761, 2768.
61
Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing multiple cases in which private employers attempted to
discriminate by claiming such discrimination was religious exercise).
51
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principles,”62 the Hobby Lobby decision does not provide a shield for
discrimination cloaked as religious practice.63 Still, some commentators fear that
the Hobby Lobby opinion paves the way for private employers to discriminate
against LGBT people by claiming religious objection.64 Although the Seventh
Circuit recently held that Title VII protects against sexual orientation
discrimination in employment,65 private employers might attempt to seek
religious exemptions from Title VII under RFRA.66 Thus, it is also important to
examine the development of Title VII to determine how its jurisprudence may
interact with RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard.

B. Title VII and Hively
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”67 Historically, some
courts held that the statute’s legislative history revealed that the sex
discrimination prohibition was included in Title VII as a “joke,” because of its
inclusion by a conservative congressman68 or that the provision lacked a
significant enough legislative history to even consider when interpreting the
statute.69 Although this view of Title VII’s legislative history—or its lack
thereof—was often benign or non-dispositive within case law, at times it caused
courts to apply a narrower reading of the provision than Title VII’s typical
degree of application to other protected classes.70 However, this narrow reading

62

Id. at 2771 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2783.
64
See Diana Beltré Acevedo, Note, Employment Discrimination: How Hobby Lobby Enables a RFRA
Affirmative Defense Against Title VII’s Protections for LGBT People in the Workplace, 86 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
1191, 1195 (2017); Richard J. D’Amato, Note, A “Very Specific” Holding: Analyzing the Effect of Hobby Lobby
on Religious Liberty Challenges to Housing Discrimination Laws, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2016);
Travin Gasper, Comment, A Religious Right to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious Freedom” as a
Threat to the LGBT Community, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 395, 396 (2015).
65
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017).
66
See Acevedo, supra note 64, at 1208.
67
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012).
68
This interpretation was rooted in the belief that the congressman included the sex discrimination
prohibition in an effort to kill the bill and because the record contained little debate when the amendment was
brought to a vote. See Bird, supra note 31, at 137 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428
n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
69
See Bird, supra note 31 (noting the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of a lack of legislative history
underlying Title VII).
70
Bird, supra note 31, at 142; see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing
to expand Title VII to protect transsexuals in part because of a “total lack of legislative history”); Corne v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (refusing to apply Title VII to claims of repeated
sexual harassment because the legislative history showed no congressional intent to include sexual harassment).
63

SHERRELL_5.21.2019_PUBLICATION COPY

1112

5/21/2019 2:49 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:1101

ultimately gave way to Supreme Court precedent expanding upon Title VII’s sex
discrimination protections.71
The Supreme Court has noted that despite the sex discrimination
prohibition’s scant legislative history, the provision “evinces a congressional
intent to ‘strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’
in employment.”72 In fact, the Court has interpreted Title VII “to cover far more
than the simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A, or a man
for Job B.”73 The Court has held that Title VII covers sexual harassment in the
workplace (including same-sex harassment),74 discrimination based on
assumptions about a person’s longevity,75 and discrimination based on a
person’s failure to conform to certain gender stereotypes.76 Although the
enacting Congress likely did not anticipate Title VII covering any of these
situations, Justice Antonin Scalia noted in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”77 This rationale has played an important role in the expansion of Title
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition and serves as a primary argument for
expanding the prohibition to include protections against LGBT discrimination.78
However, despite the Court’s precedent expanding Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition beyond what the enacting Congress envisioned, every
federal circuit had refused to interpret Title VII to cover sexual orientation
discrimination until the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively.79 In Hively, a
71

See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017); Bird, supra note 31, at 137.
Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
73
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
74
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)).
75
Id. (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978)).
76
Id. at 342 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–40 (1989)).
77
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
78
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 344.
79
Id. at 341–42; cases cited supra note 20. The primary argument against interpreting Title VII to include
protection against sexual orientation discrimination has centered on perceived congressional intent to cover only
basic notions of sex. See Patti, supra note 4, at 134. However, it is hard to square this interpretation with Supreme
Court precedent and may lead to absurd results. Id. at 135. For example, complainants may need to mask their
sexual orientation discrimination claims to avoid dismissal even where they have basic, cognizable sex
discrimination claims. Id. Additionally, lower courts that refuse to expand Title VII to protect sexual orientation
but acknowledge Supreme Court precedent regarding gender stereotyping often focus only on discrimination
based on the perception of traditional gender expression instead of gay identity. See Brian Soucek, Perceived
Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 716, 740 (2014). Thus, a gay complainant
that bucks traditional gender stereotypes more so than a similarly situated complainant may survive dismissal
where another similarly situated complainant would not.
72
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lesbian employee filed an employment discrimination claim alleging her
employer refused to promote her several times and ultimately terminated her on
the basis of her sexual orientation.80 While the Seventh Circuit initially held that
sexual orientation was not protected by Title VII,81 it later reheard the case en
banc.82 On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit applied Supreme Court precedent
expanding the scope of Title VII to find that sexual orientation discrimination
carries several of the same qualities as other discriminatory conduct prohibited
by Title VII’s sex discrimination provision.83 Particularly, the Seventh Circuit
noted two separate rationales for reading Title VII to include a prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination: the comparative method and the
associational theory.84
The Hively court’s first line of reasoning, the comparative method, involves
“isolating the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision.”85
The comparative method has been used to examine Title VII sex discrimination
claims “as far back as 1971,” in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.86 In Phillips,
the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not allow an employer to discriminate
against women with preschool age children when it does not discriminate against
men with preschool-age children.87 Later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the
Court held that Title VII prohibited an employer from refusing to promote a
woman for expressing masculine traits when it would not have refused to
promote men for expressing masculine traits.88 In Hively, the Seventh Circuit
applied this comparative method and held that, assuming the plaintiff’s
allegations that she was fired because of her sexual orientation were true, if “only
the variable of the plaintiff’s sex” were to change, she would not have been
terminated for being in a relationship with a woman.89 Thus, any adverse job
decision based on the fact that the complainant “dates or marries a same-sex
partner” is a decision “purely and simply based on sex,” and is prohibited sex
discrimination.90
80

Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 853 F.3d 339, 341
(7th Cir. 2017).
82
Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
83
See id. at 341.
84
Id. at 345.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 345–46.
87
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
88
490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989). Although Hopkins is a plurality opinion, six Justices agreed that an
employer acting on the basis of sex stereotyping has violated Title VII. See id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
89
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–47.
90
Id. at 347.
81
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The comparative method has proven to be the “gold standard” in
antidiscrimination law,91 and garnered significant traction in marriage equality
litigation.92 Before the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges held that marriage is a
fundamental right, some courts specifically applied the comparative method in
cases challenging same-sex marriage prohibitions to find that sexual orientation
discrimination was inextricably tied to sex discrimination.93 Additionally, while
the Supreme Court has not applied the comparative method to sexual orientation
discrimination claims directly, some Justices have questioned the logical
fallacies associated with treating sexual orientation discrimination differently
from sex discrimination.94 For example, during oral argument in Obergefell,95
Chief Justice John Roberts asked: “If Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can
marry him and Tom can’t. And the difference is based upon their different sex.
Why isn’t that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?”96 Justice
Anthony Kennedy also posed a similar question during oral argument in
Hollingsworth v. Perry,97 asking whether same-sex marriage prohibitions should
be treated as gender-based classifications.98 Although ultimately the Supreme
Court did not explicitly hold on the sex discrimination claims in Obergefell, and
the issue was not raised by the petitioners in Perry, the Supreme Court’s
willingness to question sexual orientation discrimination within a comparative
sex discrimination framework suggests Hively’s comparative reasoning may
prove persuasive to the Supreme Court or to federal appellate courts in other
circuits, particularly given the comparative method’s historical use in sex
discrimination claims.99
The Hively court’s second line of reasoning, the associational theory, holds
that “a person who is discriminated against because of the protected
characteristic of one with whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged
because of her own traits.”100 The Seventh Circuit in Hively noted that the
associational theory has developed primarily through Supreme Court case law

91

Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 20, at 1133.
Id. at 1137.
93
See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that state law prohibiting
same-sex marriage is constitutionally impermissible sex discrimination); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Sexual orientation discrimination can take the form of sex discrimination.”).
94
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 20, at 1138; Patti, supra note 4, at 144.
95
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
96
Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-566).
97
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
98
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144).
99
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 20, at 1133, 1135.
100
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017).
92
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challenging anti-miscegenation through discrimination claims.101 In Loving v.
Virginia,102 the Supreme Court held that despite the fact that miscegenation
statutes punished white and black participants in interracial marriage equally,
the fact that the statute drew lines based on race at all violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.103 Some circuits have applied Loving’s logic to Title VII’s race
discrimination prohibition, finding that “an employer may violate Title VII if it
takes adverse action against an employee because of the employee’s association
with a person of another race.”104 In Hively, the Seventh Circuit expanded this
theory to sexual association, noting that “the text of the statute draws no
distinction . . . among the different varieties of discrimination it addresses.”105
Thus, where the plaintiff has suffered adverse employment action based on her
association with a member of the same sex, she has suffered sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.106
The EEOC has applied the associational theory “since the earliest days of
Title VII,” and it has been enforcing Title VII prohibitions on discrimination
based on interracial association as early as 1975.107 Further, courts have
universally concluded that Title VII protects employees in interracial
relationships and that such relationships are not limited to marriage.108 Because
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hopkins commands that all protected classes
covered by Title VII be treated the same,109 the Hively court’s sexual
associational rationale provides strong persuasive authority, particularly given
the universal recognition of the associational theory in terms of race.
The concurrent histories of RFRA and Title VII’s sex discrimination
prohibition offer insights into how the statutes may interact with one another.
Given Hively’s persuasive reasoning and the Supreme Court’s expansion of Title
VII in the past, litigants, scholars, and judges should begin to seriously consider
the implications of expansive employment protections for LGBT people under
Title VII. This consideration requires recognizing that many private employers
101

Id.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
103
Id. at 12.
104
Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac,
Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999) (cognizable Title VII claim where
plaintiff alleges employer terminated him because his child was biracial); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (cognizable Title VII claim where plaintiff alleges employer
discriminated against him because of his participation in an interracial marriage).
105
Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
106
Id. at 347.
107
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 715 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 853 F.3d at 341.
108
Hively, 830 F.3d at 715.
109
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243–44 n.9 (1989).
102
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may object to employing LGBT people because of religious convictions. Such
employers are likely to seek exemptions from Title VII through RFRA claims.
Thus, LGBT litigants and activists must consider the potential relationship
between RFRA and Title VII, the ability for Title VII to practically obviate the
confusion and inefficiency associated with nonuniform antidiscrimination laws
and state iterations of RFRA, and the possibility that expanding the definition of
Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition encourages expanding the definition
of sex discrimination in other federal statutes.
II. TITLE VII PROVIDES THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST LGBT
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTION
LGBT people continue to face pervasive discrimination in employment,
housing, public accommodations, health care, and education.110 While the lack
of LGBT discrimination protections has been repeatedly noted by courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies, Congress and the majority of state
legislatures have failed to provide statutory protections against LGBT
discrimination.111 The lack of sufficient legislative and administrative
discrimination protections has caused LGBT activists and litigants to weigh a
variety of options for rectifying discrimination—both political and judicial.112
Possible political solutions have included drafting new federal legislation
amending the Civil Rights Act113 and relying on state antidiscrimination laws
that expressly protect against sexual orientation discrimination.114 These
solutions have made little headway because Congress has repeatedly failed to
pass federal legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination115 and
because only about half of the national LGBT population lives in states that
prohibit sexual orientation employment discrimination.116 Judicial solutions
have included arguing that sexual orientation status should be protected by the

110
Sejal Singh & Laura E. Durso, Widespread Discrimination Continues to Shape LGBT People’s Lives
in Subtle and Significant Ways, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 2, 2017, 8:10 AM), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2017/05/02/429529/widespread-discrimination-continues-shape-lgbtpeoples-lives-subtle-significant-ways/.
111
See Sears & Mallory, supra note 7 (noting that the federal government recognizes the widespread
nature of employment discrimination against LGBT people).
112
See Jasiunas, supra note 19, at 1534–35.
113
See id. at 1530.
114
See id. at 1529–31.
115
Patti, supra note 4, at 134.
116
JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION
LAWS AND POLICIES 5 (2012).
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment117 and arguing for more
expansive interpretations of federal antidiscrimination statutes.118 These judicial
solutions have been ineffective in the area of employment discrimination largely
because federal courts have not applied heightened scrutiny review on the basis
of sexual orientation119 and because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
to private parties.120 However, while arguments for interpreting Title VII to
include protection against sexual orientation discrimination have been largely
ineffective, the Seventh Circuit’s recent interpretation in Hively demonstrates
new promise for this method.121
Considering Hively in light of these historically unsuccessful solutions, Title
VII likely provides the best defense against sexual orientation discrimination
nationwide even in the face of religious objection. First, private religious
employers will not be able to discriminate against LGBT people on the basis of
religion because Title VII meets the strict scrutiny standard required by RFRA.
Second, Title VII provides a uniform national prohibition against sexual
orientation employment discrimination, thus eliminating the need for reliance
on nonuniform state and local antidiscrimination statutes, especially where they
may be inhibited by state RFRAs. Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s rationales for
interpreting sex discrimination in Title VII to include sexual orientation
discrimination apply with equal force to other federal statutes prohibiting sex
discrimination in a variety of areas, potentially paving the way for sweeping
antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people.

117
Beginning in the 1990s, activists and scholars began arguing that statutes that make use of sexual
orientation classifications should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment like
other suspect classes such as race and national origin. The Court has never explicitly extended more exacting
scrutiny analysis to laws discriminating on the basis of LGBT status. See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex
Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 478–80 (2001) (noting equalitybased arguments focused on the Fourteenth Amendment); Rachel Johnson Hammersmith, Comment, Equality
Trumps Religion: Why Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Inherently Promoting Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 109, 121–22 (2016) (same).
118
Litigants have consistently argued for including sexual orientation discrimination within the purview
of “sex discrimination” in the Civil Rights Act. See cases cited supra note 20.
119
Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1362 (2013).
120
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017). The Second Circuit’s
adoption of the same interpretation in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. bodes well for expanding Hively’s
interpretation to other federal circuits. 883 F.3d 100, 112, 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2018).
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A. Title VII Meets the Strict Scrutiny Standard Required by RFRA
The clash between religious liberty and equality for LGBT individuals has
been of significant public interest.122 While public discourse has centered on a
seeming impasse between these two important American values, the same
conflict has raged on in court cases across the country, both at the state and
federal levels.123 While these cases have dealt with a variety of subject matters,
many involve private, for-profit businesses asserting that the right to free
exercise enshrines the right to discriminate against LGBT people.124 Were the
Supreme Court to interpret Title VII to protect against sexual orientation
discrimination, these challenges would undoubtedly continue—Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg noted as much in her prescient dissent in Hobby Lobby.125 Thus,
in assessing Title VII’s strength, it is necessary to examine whether its sex
discrimination prohibition would meet statutory muster under RFRA. As
discussed above, under RFRA, the religious claimant must first show that the
government has placed a substantial burden on the free exercise of her
religion.126 Once the claimant has made this showing, the government must then
show that the application of the burden serves a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.127
An analysis of RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard and Title VII’s historical
survival under strict scrutiny both in the context of RFRA and other strict
scrutiny regimes suggest that Title VII would meet RFRA’s strict scrutiny
standard for several reasons. First, Title VII enforcement actions may not
122
See Cody Cain, Religious Freedom vs. Gay Rights: Can We All Get Along?, HUFFINGTON POST (July
6, 2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cody-cain/religious-freedom-vs-gay-_b_7718830.html;
Tom Gjelten, In Religious Freedom Debate, 2 American Values Clash, NPR (Feb. 28, 2017, 4:47 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/28/517092031/in-religious-freedom-debate-2-american-values-clash;
Thomas
Reese, Time For Compromise on Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/faith-and-justice/time-compromise-gay-rights-and-religious-freedom.
123
See Gjelten, supra note 122.
124
See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 4, 2018)
(shop arguing that state antidiscrimination law requiring it not to discriminate based on sexual orientation
violated free exercise rights); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 682 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
(private healthcare providers arguing health regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity
violated their religious rights pursuant to RFRA); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 3d 837, 840–41, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (funeral home arguing EEOC burdened its free exercise under
RFRA by requiring it not to discriminate against a transgender employee for wearing feminine clothing); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59, 63 (N.M. 2013) (photography company arguing state
antidiscrimination law requiring it not to discriminate based on sexual orientation violated free exercise rights);
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548, 550 (Wash. 2017) (flower shop arguing state
antidiscrimination law requiring it not to discriminate based on sexual orientation violated free exercise rights).
125
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804–05 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (c) (2012).
127
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
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constitute a substantial burden on employers’ free exercise. Second, RFRA’s
strict scrutiny standard is relatively weak compared to strict scrutiny in other
contexts. Thus, even if Title VII enforcement actions constitute a substantial
burden, Title VII meets RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard because Title VII serves
a compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination and
antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII are narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. Finally, the First Amendment’s ministerial exception prohibits the
government from interfering with intrareligious spiritual employment, providing
a compromise under which private employers engaged in for-profit business
may not discriminate against LGBT people but religious organizations serving
religious purposes may not be forced to employ LGBT individuals. In fact, the
Sixth Circuit, while simultaneously holding that Title VII expressly protects
against discrimination based on transgender status, found that RFRA provides
no affirmative defense to Title VII violations.128
1. Title VII Enforcement Actions and the Substantial Burden Requirement
The first step in the RFRA analysis requires questioning whether the federal
law “substantially burdens” the claimant’s free exercise of religion.129 Federal
courts undertake this analysis guided by post-Sherbert, pre-Smith case law.130
Helpfully, some circuits have consolidated this case law to enumerate a twoprong test for examining whether a claimant has properly alleged a substantial
burden; they hold that a federal law substantially burdens a claimant’s free
exercise if it: (1) forces a religious claimant to choose between following the
precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available or
abandoning one of the precepts of his religion to receive a benefit; or (2) places
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to
violate his religious beliefs.131 RFRA’s plain language demonstrates a distinct
difference between burdens and substantial burdens and courts have noted that
financial burdens may be too slight to trigger strict scrutiny.132 In Hobby Lobby,
128
129
130
131

EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 2018).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772, 2792.
See Mack v. Warden, 839 F.3d 286, 304 (3d Cir. 2016); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir.

2004).
132
Eternal Word TV Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1146–47 (11th
Cir.) (finding that requiring nonprofit employers to fill out opt-out forms for the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s
contraceptive mandate was not a substantial burden), vacated on other grounds, No. 14-12696-CC, 2016 WL
11503064, at *1–2 (11th Cir. May 31, 2016); see also Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell,
794 F.3d 1151, 1174 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that administrative tasks required to opt out of the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate did not constitute a substantial burden), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Zubik
v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016).
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the Court found that certain enforcement penalties under the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) constituted a substantial financial burden; there, were the employer
not to provide health insurance coverage for certain contraceptives in violation
of its religious beliefs, it could be fined upwards of $33 million per year, a
“surely substantial” pressure on the employer.133 By contrast, under Title VII
enforcement actions, combined punitive and compensatory damages are capped
at $300,000 for large employers; the caps for small employers are even lower.134
Thus, arguably any particular enforcement action under Title VII will not
substantially burden an employer solely based on damages sums. However,
given that the EEOC may also provide equitable relief under Title VII—most
notably reinstatement—religious claimants will likely argue that they must
substantially modify their behavior to employ LGBT individuals in violation of
their religious beliefs or risk repeated enforcement actions.
The Sixth Circuit addressed this concern head-on in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.—here, the employer argued that being required to
allow a transgender employee to wear feminine clothing would compel him to
be “directly involved in supporting the idea that sex is a changeable social
construct rather than an immutable God-given gift.”135 However, the court noted
that a party may sincerely believe he is being coerced into violating his religion
without being so engaged as a matter of law.136 Thus, while equitable relief
enforcing Title VII may cause some employers to believe they are being forced
to retain or accommodate LGBT employees in violation of their religious beliefs,
“bare compliance with Title VII” does not establish the kind of substantial
burden prohibited by RFRA.137
However, although post-Sherbert case law never allowed for-profit
businesses to assert religious freedom claims, the Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder
noted that the threat of civil sanctions is enough to impose a substantial
burden.138 Thus, any punitive fine for noncompliance with government action
that burdens free exercise may constitute a substantial burden even if asserted
by a wealthy corporation. Given this possibility, and the possibility that other
circuits may disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the relationship

133

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON RETALIATION AND
RELATED ISSUES 59 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/retaliation-guidance.pdf.
135
884 F.3d 560, 588 (6th Cir. 2018).
136
Id. (emphasis added).
137
Id.
138
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)).
134
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between RFRA’s substantial burden requirement and Title VII, it is necessary to
determine whether Title VII’s sex discrimination provision meets the remainder
of the strict scrutiny analysis required by RFRA.
2. RFRA’s Relatively Weak Strict Scrutiny Standard
Strict scrutiny analysis is not a mechanical test nor is it applied identically
among different areas of federal jurisprudence; in fact, empirical evidence
suggests that in some contexts strict scrutiny analysis is weaker than in other
contexts despite carrying the same label.139 Laws challenged under weaker strict
scrutiny regimes stand a better chance at survival than laws challenged in more
rigorous strict scrutiny contexts.140 While in some contexts strict scrutiny
analysis is so rigorous as to be considered “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” free
exercise claims for exemptions under the Sherbert and RFRA standard have
been relatively easier to overcome.141 Thus, Title VII likely meets RFRA’s strict
scrutiny standard in part because the standard is notably weaker than strict
scrutiny analysis in other contexts.142
RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard is modeled after Sherbert’s, and Congress
intended federal courts to use post-Sherbert, pre-Smith case law in its
application.143 After Sherbert, the Court granted few religious-based exemptions
to generally applicable laws even when applying the strict scrutiny standard.144
In fact, under the Sherbert regime, federal appellate courts turned away 87% of
free exercise exemption cases,145 leading some commentators to proclaim the
strict scrutiny standard applied in exemption cases as “strict in theory, feeble in
fact.”146 Similarly, exemption claims under RFRA are relatively easy to
overcome,147 squaring with Congress’s legislative intent to reinstate the law as
it was prior to Smith.148 Although the Supreme Court arguably strengthened
RFRA in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal by
requiring the government to justify a law’s burden on the individual claimant in
139
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 870 (2006).
140
See id. at 815.
141
See id. at 807, 859–60, 870.
142
See id. at 859–60, 870.
143
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8
(1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898).
144
Winkler, supra note 139, at 858–59.
145
Id. at 859.
146
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).
147
See Winkler, supra note 139, at 809.
148
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791.
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the case,149 lower courts have continued to apply RFRA’s weaker standard.150
Courts have done so not only by limiting what constitutes a substantial burden
but also by continuing to rely on post-Sherbert, pre-Smith case law to establish
exemptions.151 Thus, Gonzales has not greatly affected judicial analysis in the
lower courts and RFRA’s weaker standard persists.152 This weaker standard
impacts both factors of the strict scrutiny analysis: whether the challenged law
serves a compelling governmental interest and whether it is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.153
3. Examining Title VII Under the Strict Scrutiny Standard
Under RFRA’s strict scrutiny framework, the government must first
demonstrate that the federal law at issue serves a compelling interest.154 Whether
an interest qualifies as compelling is typically dependent upon the context in
which the court applies the test.155 Given that RFRA’s strict scrutiny analysis is
relatively weak, the government faces a lesser burden in demonstrating that a
federal law serves a compelling interest.156 Under this lesser burden, Title VII’s
sex discrimination prohibition clearly serves a compelling interest. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that preventing sex discrimination constitutes a
compelling interest even in the context of freedom of association,157 where strict
scrutiny analysis has historically been more difficult to overcome.158 Further, the
Sixth Circuit, in Harris Funeral Homes, held that even if Title VII were to
impose a substantial burden on employers’ religious beliefs, Title VII serves a
compelling governmental interest and thus meets this prong of the RFRA
analysis.159

149

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 35, 63 (2015).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 64.
153
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1321 (2007).
154
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
155
Fallon, Jr., supra note 153.
156
Id. at 1306–07.
157
See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (state has
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women where it may infringe freedom of association);
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628–29 (1984) (state has compelling interest in preventing discrimination
against women in public accommodations).
158
See Winkler, supra note 139, at 867–68.
159
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2018).
150
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Additionally, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,160 the Supreme Court
explicitly upheld a law school’s nondiscrimination policy, maintained pursuant
to a state civil rights law, protecting against sexual orientation discrimination in
a First Amendment strict scrutiny claim.161 Although the Court’s decision
emphasized that the university’s policy was constitutional partially because it
regulated access to a limited public forum, Justice John Paul Stevens in a
concurring opinion emphasized the viewpoint-neutral nature of the policy.162 He
noted that the policy withstood First Amendment scrutiny because it had only
an incidental burden on free exercise in furtherance of its serious goal of
preventing discrimination.163 This is particularly important in the context of Title
VII because its antidiscrimination protections are viewpoint neutral; they apply
equally to all employers of a certain size.164 While Title VII claims do not
implicate the public forum doctrine like the claim in Christian Legal Society,165
the fact that the Court explicitly upheld an LGBT antidiscrimination policy in
compliance with a state antidiscrimination law against a religious freedom claim
suggests that neutral antidiscrimination laws like Title VII that do not single out
religious groups will withstand heightened scrutiny.
Further, in the context of religious freedom, the Court has held that
preventing racial discrimination is a compelling interest sufficient to overcome
free exercise rights.166 Since “[t]he text of [Title VII] draws no distinction . . .
among the different varieties of discrimination it addresses,”167 and Title VII
also protects against racial discrimination,168 the government has a compelling
interest in preventing sex discrimination even if it impedes free exercise rights
under RFRA. Additionally, although Gonzales and Hobby Lobby have arguably
strengthened RFRA’s weak strict scrutiny standard, religious claimants since
those decisions have fared better mostly in cases involving the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate.169 Religious claimants have been successful in these
cases because courts have repeatedly found that the government’s interest in
enforcing the contraceptive mandate is too weak to overcome religious freedom
160
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661 (2010).
161
Id. at 696–97.
162
Id. at 699–700.
163
See id. at 701.
164
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
165
Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 691.
166
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (applying the strict scrutiny standard
of review mandated by Sherbert).
167
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 349 (7th Cir. 2017).
168
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
169
Lupu, supra note 150, at 67.
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rights.170 Thus, arguably Hobby Lobby has only strengthened RFRA in terms of
the contraceptive mandate and it does not diminish the government’s compelling
interest in preventing sex discrimination. In fact, the Court’s language in Hobby
Lobby expressly supports such a finding; it noted, “the Government has a
compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce,” and that its decision “provides no such shield” to “discrimination in
hiring . . . cloaked as religious practice.”171 Thus, given the Court’s repeated
recognition that preventing sex discrimination is a compelling governmental
interest, its upholding of a state sexual orientation antidiscrimination policy
against a heightened scrutiny First Amendment claim, and the Court’s express
preclusion that Hobby Lobby diminishes such governmental interests,172 Title
VII satisfies the first step of the strict scrutiny analysis.
Once the government has demonstrated that the law at issue serves a
compelling interest, it must show that the law “is the least restrictive means” for
achieving that interest.173 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
antidiscrimination statutes preventing sex discrimination are the least restrictive
means for achieving the government’s interest in eradicating sex
discrimination.174 Further, some federal courts have already expressly found in
RFRA-based religious exemption cases that sex discrimination prohibitions are
the least restrictive means for furthering the government’s compelling interest
in preventing sex discrimination.175 In fact, the Sixth Circuit noted in Harris
Funeral Homes that Title VII is “precisely tailored” to achieve the government’s
compelling interest in eradicating sex discrimination.176 Since there is no least
restrictive means for preventing discrimination other than blanket prohibition of
the discrimination itself,177 Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition is the least
restrictive means for preventing sex discrimination and satisfies the second step
of the analysis.

170

Id.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
172
See id.
173
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
174
See N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. Rotary Int’l
v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
175
See Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2006);
Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
176
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 595 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783).
177
See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from AntiDiscrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 83 (2015).
171
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4. The Ministerial Exception and Intrareligious Employment Decisions
Given that Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition serves a compelling
government interest and is the least restrictive means for achieving that interest,
RFRA will not provide an exemption to private, for-profit businesses permitting
sexual orientation discrimination. However, religious organizations that operate
primarily for religious purposes are not and will not be required to comply with
Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition with respect to ministerial
employees.178 Title VII expressly includes a ministerial exception allowing
religious organizations to discriminate in employment against those of different
religions.179 Courts have interpreted the exception, in conjunction with the First
Amendment, to allow such discrimination even where it falls disproportionately
on protected classes under federal law.180 The ministerial exception provides a
compromise between religious freedom rights and LGBT rights because it
affords maximum employment protection to LGBT people in the private sector
while upholding the rights of religious organizations undertaking religious
purposes to freely choose their spiritual leaders.
One potential issue related to the ministerial exception and its effect on Title
VII arises out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Presiding Bishop v. Amos.181
In Amos, the Court held that a church was expressly exempted by Title VII’s
ministerial exception from Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination
when it terminated a building engineer for failing to adhere to the church’s
religious principles.182 Arguably, were Amos to be extended to private
employers, such employers could cloak LGBT discrimination under the guise of
discrimination based on nonadherence to the employer’s religious principles.
However, the ministerial exception has only ever applied to religious employers
serving religious purposes as it is designed to “alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define
and carry out their religious missions.”183 Further, this possibility is arguably

178

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
180
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 (upholding the ministerial exception against countervailing
disability discrimination claims); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–01 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that the ministerial exception precluded the court from hearing disability discrimination claim by
former pastor of church); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that ministerial exception precluded the court from entertaining sex discrimination claim by
woman seeking position on pastoral staff).
181
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987).
182
Id. at 330, 339.
183
Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
179
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precluded by Christian Legal Society. In Christian Legal Society, the Supreme
Court held that the Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of
California, a religious organization carrying out a religious mission, was not
entitled to an exemption from the university’s nondiscrimination policy
protecting against sexual orientation and religious discrimination.184 Although
the student organization argued that its religious mission required discriminating
against individuals who did not adhere to its religious tenets, the Court
emphasized the viewpoint neutral nature of the nondiscrimination policy.185 In
his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that although the policy
may have a disparate impact on religious student organizations, its general
applicability warranted a finding that it survived a constitutional heightened
scrutiny analysis.186 Thus, even if the Court were to expand Amos to private
employers, the viewpoint-neutral nature of Title VII will likely not allow such
employers to mask LGBT discrimination as permissible discrimination on the
basis of nonadherence to the employer’s religious principles.
Given these considerations, not only does Title VII provide the best
opportunity for compromise between the rights of religious employers and
LGBT employees, it operates in line with Sherbert precedent and RFRA
precedent. Thus, Title VII properly meets RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard and
would provide protection for LGBT employees even in the face of religious
exemption claims. Title VII’s relationship with RFRA is important because it
ultimately will bear a significant impact on Title VII’s practical applicability;
this is particularly so because Hively’s interpretation of Title VII could possibly
extend employment discrimination protection to LGBT employees nationally,
obviating the need for LGBT employees to rely on nonuniform state and local
laws or private corporate policies.
B. Title VII Obviates the Need for Reliance on Nonuniform Laws and Policies
There currently exists a national landscape of uncertainty and nonuniformity
in state, local, and private-based employment protections for LGBT people.
Over half of the American LGBT population lives in areas where discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is completely legal.187
Despite this staggering statistic, the majority of Americans actually believe that

184
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 669 (2010).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 700 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187
HUNT, supra note 116.
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such discrimination is illegal nationwide.188 However, protections at the federal
level are either nonexistent, inconsistent, or incomplete, leaving much of the task
of protecting against LGBT employment discrimination to state and local
governments or private businesses.189 Further, state and local protections are
seriously varied; in some cases they are nonexistent, unenforceable, or face the
specter of restricted applicability under state-level RFRAs.190 Additionally,
although many large multistate corporations have shouldered some of the burden
of protecting LGBT employees by adopting company-wide nondiscrimination
policies, such policies provide inadequate remedies and enforcement
mechanisms.191 This nonuniformity has produced a landscape of confusion and
inefficiency surrounding LGBT employment protections and religious-based
exemptions to such protections.192 Considering Congress’s repeated failures to
pass comprehensive national LGBT employment protections, Hively’s
interpretation of Title VII stands as the best option for eliminating this
unnecessary confusion, alleviating its harmful impacts on both LGBT
individuals and multistate employers. This section proceeds first by discussing
the mismatched legislative landscape among various states in terms of state
antidiscrimination statutes and state RFRAs. Then, it examines the ameliorative
effects that curing such nonuniformity would have on LGBT individuals and on
multistate businesses.
1. Nonuniformity of Antidiscrimination Statutes and RFRA Statutes Among
the States
Only twenty-one states have employment antidiscrimination laws that
expressly protect sexual orientation.193 Another twenty-one states have their
own religious freedom restoration statutes applying heightened scrutiny to state
laws that burden free exercise.194 That number increases to thirty-one when
including state court decisions applying heightened religious freedom

188
Michael T. Zugelder, Toward Equal Rights for LGBT Employees: Legal and Managerial Implications
for Employers, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (2017).
189
Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT
People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment
Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 742 (2012).
190
Id. at 755–57; see also Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of
LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2015).
191
Pizer et al., supra note 189, at 759.
192
Id. at 720.
193
See State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/
employment (last updated Jan. 28, 2019).
194
See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
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protections.195 There are four states with both a religious freedom restoration
statute and an employment antidiscrimination statute that protects against sexual
orientation discrimination.196 Of these four, only New Mexico has explicitly
examined the relationship between its state RFRA and its antidiscrimination
statute,197 but held that its RFRA was inapplicable in suits between private
parties.198 Additionally, only two states include carve-outs in their state RFRAs
prohibiting the use of the RFRA to avoid compliance with civil rights statutes.199
Therefore, it is unclear whether religious freedom rights under a state RFRA
would trump a state antidiscrimination statute protecting sexual orientation in
many cases. Given this varying landscape of state law, LGBT people may be
protected from employment discrimination when in one state but be subjected
to explicit discrimination when in another.
Scholars and other legal professionals have long noted the importance of
uniformity in state law.200 In fact, one of the founding purposes of the American
Bar Association and the American Law Institute was to promote uniformity of
laws throughout the several states and for centuries the National Conference of
the Uniform Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has attempted to achieve
this.201 Uniformity in the law provides significant advantages by eliminating
uncertainty within the legal system, promoting efficiency,202 and upholding the

195
Juliet Eilperin, 31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 1,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-the-u-s-are-there-heightenedprotections-for-religious-freedom/?utm_term=.e5500b773c5a.
196
They are Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b
(West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 (West 2016);
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/10 (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1–28-1-15 (West 2011); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-22-1–28-22-5 (West 2011); 42 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-80.1-1–42-80.1-4 (West 2014); 28
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-5 (West 2006).
197
See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
198
Id. at 76–77.
199
While Texas and Indiana’s RFRA statutes include carve-outs for civil rights protections, they have no
state civil rights statutes protecting against LGBT discrimination. However, the carve-out in the Texas statute
prohibits its use to avoid compliance with federal civil rights statutes. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 110.011 (West 2018). Indiana’s RFRA statute expressly prohibits its use to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-9-0.7 (West Supp. 2018).
200
See, e.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Uniform State Laws: A Discussion Focused on Revision of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 257 (1997); William Schofield, Uniformity of Law in the Several
States as an American Ideal, 21 HARV. L. REV. 583 (1908); Joseph J. Carroll, Comment, Avoiding Backlash:
The Exclusion of Domestic Partnership Language in the 2008 Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code and
the Future for Same-Sex Intestacy Rights, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 623 (2013).
201
James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2097 (1991). See generally Herbert F.
Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 283 (1951) (noting the purpose of the
founding of the American Law Institute was to address the uncertainty and complexity in American law
produced by the making of law by several different state courts and federal courts).
202
Carroll, supra note 200, at 625–26.
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legitimacy of the courts.203 Although it may sometimes be preferable for states
to voluntarily adopt uniform laws drafted by politically insulated conferences or
committees, controversial issues producing disagreement among the states will
not allow uniformity in all areas of state law.204 In these areas, federal legislation
may be the only appropriate and achievable response.205 Because protecting
against LGBT employment discrimination is a controversial point of
disagreement among the states,206 federal legislation like Title VII serves as the
best avenue for securing nationwide employment discrimination protection for
LGBT people, obviating the need for reliance on state and local
antidiscrimination statutes that may not be available or may be limited in
applicability by state RFRAs. Further, federal law has historically led the charge
in creating and standardizing employment discrimination protections, causing
many state judges to look to federal law to interpret their own state
antidiscrimination statutes.207 Thus, Hively’s interpretation of Title VII would
extend employment protections to LGBT individuals nationwide, likely enhance
the protections some states already afford LGBT employees, and serve to
ameliorate the harmful social and economic impacts discrimination and
nonuniformity in discrimination protections have on both LGBT individuals and
multistate businesses. This is particularly so because antidiscrimination
legislation has visibly reduced discrimination.208
2. Impact of National Antidiscrimination Legislation on LGBT Individuals
Although antidiscrimination legislation sometimes results in low
enforcement rates or low numbers of complaints that the legislation is being
violated, its symbolic power is significant.209 By illegalizing discrimination,
legislation sends a strong social signal that discrimination is unacceptable.210
This signal is even stronger when antidiscrimination legislation applies
nationwide because it leads to increased public awareness and serves to promote

203

Schofield, supra note 200, at 592.
Carroll, supra note 200, at 627.
205
Nim Razook, Uniform Private Laws, National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws
Signaling and Federal Preemption, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 41, 61 (2000).
206
See supra Section II.B.1 discussing the differences between LGBT discrimination protection laws
among the states.
207
Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State and
Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 478 (2006).
208
Laura G. Barron & Michelle Hebl, The Force of Law: The Effects of Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Legislation on Interpersonal Discrimination in Employment, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
191, 194 (2013).
209
Id.
210
Id.
204
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positive changes in attitude towards stigmatized groups.211 Because these
positive effects are greater the more widespread the antidiscrimination law,
national LGBT antidiscrimination protections would likely increase positive
support nationwide, ameliorating the personal negative effects employment
discrimination has on LGBT individuals resulting from stigma.212 Thus, Title
VII’s sexual orientation protections would diminish the harmful effects of
nonuniform LGBT employment discrimination, particularly in states and
localities without any discrimination protections for LGBT individuals at all.
Title VII’s protection would not only reduce the national prevalence of LGBT
employment discrimination, it would also reduce some of the harmful effects
LGBT discrimination has on businesses that conduct activities in multiple states
or localities with mismatched discrimination protections.
3. Impact of National Antidiscrimination Legislation on Multistate
Businesses
Nonuniformity in LGBT antidiscrimination law not only harms LGBT
individuals, it places significant economic costs on multistate businesses and the
market as a whole.213 In fact, one report suggests LGBT workplace
discrimination costs American businesses up to $64 billion per year.214 LGBT
discrimination not only affects recruitment and retention rates (which increases
turnover costs), it also stifles productivity by increasing absenteeism and
physical and mental health problems of employees.215 In response to these
economic consequences, many large multistate businesses maintain companywide nondiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation and gender
identity.216 In fact, 91% of Fortune 500 companies maintain sexual orientation
nondiscrimination policies and 83% include gender identity in their
nondiscrimination policies.217 These nondiscrimination policies may not only

211

Id. at 195.
Id. at 194–95.
213
CROSBY BURNS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE COSTLY BUSINESS OF DISCRIMINATION: THE
ECONOMIC COSTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY IN
THE WORKPLACE 6 (2012).
214
Harry Bradford, Workplace Discrimination Costs Businesses $64 Billion Every Year, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 23, 2012, 8:43 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/workplace-discrimination-costsbusinesses-cap_n_1373835.html.
215
BURNS, supra note 213, at 8–12.
216
See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2018: RATING WORKPLACES ON
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER EQUALITY 6 (2017); BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY,
ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR ADOPTING LGBT-RELATED WORKPLACE POLICIES 2 (2011), https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Mallory-Sears-Corp-Statements-Oct2011.pdf.
217
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 216.
212
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mitigate the negative economic consequences of LGBT workplace
discrimination, they could increase business from consumers who place
importance on the social responsibility of the businesses they are buying from.218
National nondiscrimination policies can also lead to increased stock prices for
businesses, and may lower insurance costs.219 However, requiring multistate
private businesses to shoulder the burden of limiting the market impacts of
LGBT discrimination on a national level also imposes significant financial costs
on private market players.220 These include compliance costs because of the need
for additional training and record-keeping; cash costs including staffing,
additional employee benefits, and monitoring processes; opportunity costs
resulting from the diversion of resources to implementation and enforcement
from other productive activities; and execution risk because sustainable
nondiscrimination policies often require a serious shift in corporate culture.221
Thus, to place as little of these costs on private enterprise as possible and to
minimize the harmful market effects of discrimination, uniform national LGBT
antidiscrimination protection under Hively’s interpretation of Title VII is
necessary. Inversely, Title VII’s LGBT discrimination protections may increase
nondiscrimination’s pro-market effects by improving coworker relationships,
improving stock prices, opening businesses up to a socially conscious set of
consumers, and decreasing insurance costs.222
Given that LGBT employment discrimination protections constitute a matter
of considerable discourse and division among the states, federal LGBT
employment discrimination protection under Title VII best mitigates the harmful
effects of nonuniformity in state and local discrimination prohibitions. LGBT
antidiscrimination laws are highly variable among states and local governments
leading to confusion; the existence of state RFRAs and lack of clarity over their
relationships with discrimination protections add to this confusion.223 Thus, Title
VII’s uniform protection is particularly needed because of the notable harm
nonuniformity poses to both LGBT individuals and multistate businesses.
Further, Hively’s rationales are arguably analogous to other federal statutes
218
M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF LGBT-SUPPORTIVE WORKPLACE POLICIES 19–
23 (2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Business-Impact-LGBT-Policies-FullReport-May-2013.pdf.
219
Id.
220
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY: A STUDY ON METHODS AND
INDICATORS TO MEASURE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF DIVERSITY POLICIES IN ENTERPRISES 10–11 (2003),
https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/mars/source/resources/references/others/17%20-%20Costs%20and%
20Benefits%20of%20Diversity%20-%20EU%202003%20ExSum.pdf.
221
Id.
222
See BADGETT ET AL., supra note 218, at 13–14, 19–23.
223
Pizer et al., supra note 189, at 755–57.
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prohibiting sex discrimination; thus, expanding the definition of “sex
discrimination” in other federal statutes to include sexual orientation
discrimination would provide national discrimination protections for LGBT
people not only in employment but in other areas including education, credit,
and housing.
C. Expanding the Hively Interpretation of “Sex Discrimination” to Other
Federal Statutes
The Seventh Circuit’s reading of Title VII in Hively largely centered on the
expansive evolution of the definition of “sex discrimination” in Title VII.224 Sex
discrimination is prohibited by a number of other federal statutes including Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),225 the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA),226 and the Fair Housing Act.227 When different
statutes use the same term on the same subject, federal courts generally presume
the term has the same meaning across the statutes.228 This is particularly so when
the statutes have the same or highly similar purposes.229 Thus, because the other
antidiscrimination statutes share the same language of “sex discrimination” and
are primarily intended to eradicate sex discrimination, the definition of sex
discrimination in each should be interpreted the same way and each would pass
statutory muster under RFRA for the same reasons as Title VII.230 By applying
the rationales for expanding Title VII in Hively to existing precedent on other
federal antidiscrimination statutes, litigants may argue for expansive LGBT
discrimination protections; in fact, some courts have already expanded Title VII
precedent to sex discrimination prohibitions in education under Title IX,231
credit under the ECOA,232 and housing under the Fair Housing Act,233
suggesting federal courts may be willing to apply Hively’s rationales to other
sex discrimination statutes.

224
225

See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 343–45 (7th Cir. 2017).
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs receiving federal

funding).
226

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012) (prohibiting creditors from discriminating against an applicant on the basis

of sex).
227

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting sex discrimination in “the sale or rental of housing”).
See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991).
229
See, e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of the Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
230
Because eradicating sex discrimination serves a compelling interest and antidiscrimination statutes
have been repeatedly held to be the least restrictive means for eradicating discrimination, these other statutes
would similarly meet RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard. See supra notes 129–86 and accompanying text.
231
See infra Section II.C.1.
232
See infra Section II.C.2.
233
See infra Section II.C.3.
228
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1. Sex Discrimination Under Title IX
Title IX prohibits educational programs that receive federal funding, from
discriminating on the basis of sex.234 Because Congress passed Title IX eight
years after Title VII had been in effect, most courts explicitly adopt Title VII
precedent to interpret Title IX.235 In fact, several courts have made direct
comparisons between Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition and Title IX’s
sex discrimination prohibition.236 Particularly, courts have used Title VII case
law to find that Title IX similarly provides actionable sex discrimination claims
for same-sex sexual harassment and sex stereotyping in education,237 which are
both examples of the comparative method in Hively of isolating the
complainant’s sex and determining whether the discrimination would have
occurred if her sex were different.238 The U.S. Department of Education has
taken this position as well, noting that under the sex stereotyping theory, students
who are subjected to harassment based on their perceived LGBT status have
suffered prohibited sex discrimination under Title IX.239 In addition, federal
courts have generally been more willing to expand the scope of sex
discrimination under Title IX to protect against discrimination based on actual
or perceived LGBT status than other antidiscrimination statutes.240 Thus, Hively
provides possibly already sympathetic federal courts with strong rationales for
explicitly identifying sexual orientation discrimination as actionable sex
discrimination in Title IX instead of adjudicating LGBT discrimination through
sex stereotyping or sexual harassment claims, providing significant protection
for LGBT individuals in education.

234

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment as Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 219–20 (2005).
236
See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d
881, 896–97 (1st Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th
Cir. 1987).
237
See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 746 (E.D. Va. 2018) (actionable sex
stereotyping claim); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 715 (D. Md. 2018) (actionable
sex stereotyping claim); Roe v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1026 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(actionable sexual harassment claim); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 833–34 (S.D. Iowa
2004) (actionable sexual harassment claim).
238
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017).
239
Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Oct.
26, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/guidance-targeting-harassment-outlines-local-and-federalresponsibility.
240
See Weiner, supra note 235, at 227.
235
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2. Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Federal courts have similarly used Title VII case law to interpret the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.241 The ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating
against applicants with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis
of sex.242 Though initially the ECOA was arguably intended to prohibit
discrimination in the provision of credit to married women, many courts have
interpreted the ECOA’s purpose as eliminating discrimination for all credit
applicants.243 Many federal agencies, including the Department of Justice and
National Credit Union Administration, have also expressed concern that
prospective homebuyers and other applicants may face discrimination in efforts
to obtain loans, and thus be precluded from the benefits provided by access to
credit.244 Because of these concerns, many courts have extended the ECOA’s
protections to unmarried couples and to men.245 Additionally, at least one federal
circuit has applied the Title VII comparative method to find that transgender
individuals could assert sex stereotyping claims under the ECOA.246 Although
little case law has developed the ECOA’s sex discrimination provision, the fact
that it is largely interpreted in line with Title VII247 suggests that Hively’s
rationales are persuasive arguments for expanding the ECOA’s sex
discrimination provision to cover sexual orientation discrimination. This is
particularly true for courts that interpret the ECOA’s purpose as wholly
eradicating discrimination in credit transactions for all applicants.248 Because of
the importance of access to credit both for individuals and for small
businesses,249 there are strong policy rationales for expanding Hively’s
reasoning to the ECOA to protect LGBT individuals from discrimination in the
provision of credit.

241
See Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998).
242
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012).
243
Laura Eckert, Inclusion of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 103
COM. L.J. 311, 318 (1998).
244
Id. at 320 n.57.
245
See id. at 318.
246
See Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215.
247
See, e.g., id.
248
See, e.g., Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting the ECOA’s initial
purpose was to eradicate discrimination against women but that “Congress reaffirmed the goal of
antidiscrimination in credit” by adding other protected classes); Davis v. Strata Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 643, 650
(D.N.D. 2003).
249
Eckert, supra note 243, at 319–20.
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3. Sex Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act
Much like the expansion of sex discrimination under Title VII to situations
other than simple disparate treatment between men and women, federal courts
have noted various other actions that constitute actionable sex discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act such as sexual harassment and sex stereotyping. A
number of federal circuits have applied Title VII case law holding sexual
harassment to be actionable sex discrimination to find that the Fair Housing Act
prohibits sexual harassment in housing.250 In fact, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has noted that Title VII case law
warrants a finding that the Fair Housing Act analogously prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination in housing at least when the discrimination is based
on sex stereotyping.251 Additionally, some litigants have already used the sex
stereotyping theory to successfully assert Fair Housing Act sex discrimination
claims.252 Given HUD’s official stance that the Fair Housing Act prohibits
LGBT discrimination253 and the willingness of federal courts to entertain Title
VII comparative-style sex stereotyping housing discrimination claims,254 the
Seventh Circuit’s expansion of sex discrimination to cover sexual orientation
discrimination in Title VII255 provides strong persuasive authority for courts to
further expand LGBT housing protections under the Fair Housing Act.
Because Title IX, the ECOA, and the Fair Housing Act are all interpreted in
line with Title VII precedent, the reasoning set forth in Hively provides strong
rationales for expanding the definition of “sex discrimination” in these other
statutes to protect against sexual orientation discrimination in a broad range of
areas. Additionally, because these statutes share similar language and a similar
purpose to Title VII, the fact that Title VII likely meets RFRA’s strict scrutiny
standard256 means that these other antidiscrimination statutes would similarly
meet the RFRA standard. Thus, even in the face of religious objection, the
application of the statutes’ antidiscrimination provisions will not be weakened
250
See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2010); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008
(7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993).
251
Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,058–59 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
100).
252
Smith v. Avanti, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1201 (D. Colo. 2017); Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Butts, No. 11-00670
LEK-BMK, 2012 WL 5996436, at *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 30, 2012).
253
See 24 C.F.R. § 5.105 (2016); Equal Access in Accordance with an Individual’s Gender Identity in
Community Planning and Development Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,763, 64,781 (Sept. 21, 2016) (to be codified
at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
254
See cases cited supra note 252.
255
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017).
256
See supra Section II.A.
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by private claims. Finally, reliance on these laws would ameliorate the harms
posed by nonuniform antidiscrimination laws—reducing the confusion
associated with nonuniformity and providing LGBT individuals, employers, and
others with a landscape of equality that is not dependent on the state or
municipality in which she is located. Given these possibilities, expanding the
Seventh Circuit’s rationales in Hively provides the best defense against LGBT
discrimination in the face of religious objection. Thus, litigants should
strategically focus on expanding Hively—not only to other federal
antidiscrimination statutes but also among federal circuits. Establishing a greater
consensus among U.S. Courts of Appeals would not only geographically expand
Title VII’s protections but could also better persuade the Supreme Court to apply
Hively’s comparative method and associational method to Title VII to find that
it prohibits LGBT discrimination.
III. EXTENDING HIVELY’S RATIONALE TO OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUITS
The Seventh Circuit and the Second Circuit are the only federal circuits to
hold that Title VII protects against sexual orientation discrimination; every other
federal circuit has held that sexual orientation discrimination is not actionable
under Title VII.257 The circuit split created by Hively has yet to be resolved by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the split
last Term by reviewing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Evans v. Georgia
Regional Hospital where the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.258 However, the Court denied the
claimant’s petition for a writ of certiorari.259 Though the denial did not contain
an opinion, because of the recency of the circuit split, this may have been a
“defensive denial” by which some of the Justices strategically avoided a
determination on the merits by the current Court despite disagreement with the
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation.260 Even if certiorari was not denied
defensively, it may have been denied so that other federal circuits can develop
more contemporary opinions on Title VII—a concept known as “percolation,”261
which some Justices have argued better equips the Court to reach informed
ultimate decisions.262 Regardless of the Court’s rationale for denying certiorari
257

See cases cited supra note 20.
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
259
Evans, 138 S. Ct. at 557.
260
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 414 (2004).
261
Id. at 438.
262
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that percolation “may yield a better informed and more enduring
final pronouncement by this Court.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
258
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on this issue, litigants and LGBT activists now have the opportunity to extend
the Seventh Circuit’s rationales in Hively to other federal circuits before the
Supreme Court reaches a decision. They have already done so in the Second
Circuit.263 By examining the two rationales for expanding Title VII asserted by
the Seventh Circuit in Hively—the comparative method and the associational
method—as applied in other contexts by the different federal circuits, LGBT
litigants may develop powerful, persuasive arguments for applying circuit
precedent to interpret Title VII as prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination.264
A. The Comparative Method in Other Federal Circuits
As discussed above, the comparative method involves isolating the
complainant’s sex and determining whether changing only the variable of her
sex would result in the same action by the employer; if not, the complainant has
been discriminated against based on sex.265 The comparative method is “triedand-true” in Title VII jurisprudence.266 The Supreme Court first applied the
comparative method in 1971;267 since then, the Court has expanded the
comparative method to find that discrimination based on nonconformity with
sex stereotypes is actionable sex discrimination.268 Most federal circuits have
since explicitly held that discrimination based on sex stereotyping or gender
nonconformity is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII, interpreting
Hopkins to establish the kind of “but for” comparative method explicitly laid out
by the Seventh Circuit in Hively.269 While the dissent in Hively argued that the
comparative method is meant as an evidentiary tool rather than an interpretive

dissenting)).
263
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., relied upon the same rationales
from Hively to find that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll.,
883 F.3d 100, 112–28 (2d Cir. 2018).
264
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345, 347 (7th Cir. 2017).
265
Id. at 345; see supra Section I.B.
266
Hively, 853 F.3d at 362.
267
See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
268
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
269
See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2017); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017); EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 453–54 (5th Cir.
2013); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., LLC, 591 F.3d 1033, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2010); Schroer v. Billington,
525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2007); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2004);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214
F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (interpreting the ECOA using Title VII case law); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting the Gender Motivated Violence Act using Title VII case law);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143–44 (4th Cir. 1996).
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tool,270 several circuits have applied it interpretively to find that sex stereotyping
is prohibited by Title VII.271
Although no circuits besides the Seventh and Second Circuits have yet
applied the comparative method to find that LGBT discrimination is actionable
under Title VII, some circuits may be poised to revisit the question.272
Previously, Title VII jurisprudence in these circuits often centered on
categorically separating the definitions of “sex” and “sexual orientation” or
“transgender status” as distinct classes such that Title VII would only cover
biological notions of sex.273 However, several courts have noted the difficulty in
delineating between discrimination based on sex and discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity because sex is often an inextricable factor
in examining whether LGBT discrimination has occurred.274 Expanding the
definition of sex discrimination to encompass sexual orientation and gender
identity eliminates the logical confusion associated with this tenuous distinction.
This expansion also makes logical sense after Hopkins because in cases of sexual
orientation discrimination, by isolating and changing the sex of the claimant and
keeping other variables the same—most notably the sex of the claimant’s partner
or the sex that the claimant is attracted to—the discrimination would not have
occurred.275 This logic is similar to Title VII sex stereotyping claims already
embraced by the other circuits because they also involve isolating and changing
the claimant’s sex and keeping other variables the same—such as clothing,276

270

Hively, 853 F.3d at 365 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Cases cited supra note 269.
272
See Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, No. 1820251, 2019 WL 458405, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2019) (the Fifth Circuit did not address whether sexual
orientation discrimination is a cognizable claim under Title VII); Harrington v. City of Attleboro, No. 15-cv12769-DJC, 2018 WL 475000, at *6 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2018) (noting that actual or perceived sexual orientation
discrimination is cognizable as sex stereotyping claim under Title VII); Squire v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. MJG17-3597, 2018 WL 3036474, at *5 (D. Md. June 19, 2008) (refusing to dismiss sexual orientation claim under
Title VII).
273
See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007); Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 1996).
274
See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the borders between sex
and sexual orientation as classes are imprecise, making it difficult to determine whether a Title VII claimant has
asserted a case of sex discrimination or sexual orientation discrimination); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d
403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination
because of sex is hardly clear.”); Patti, supra note 4, at 136 (citing Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d
285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of
sex’ can be difficult to draw.”).
275
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
276
Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291; Ellingsworth v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 546, 553 (E.D. Penn.
2017).
271
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physical mannerisms,277 and hair style.278 Notably, these variables constitute
self-expression of identity. Because sexual identity and choice of spouse or life
partner are some of the most important pieces of identity one can express,279
expanding the comparative method to cover sexual orientation discrimination
flows logically from sex stereotyping precedent in other circuits.
Though opponents of this interpretation have argued that it does not square
with Congress’s understanding of the definition of “sex” at the time of
enactment,280 the Supreme Court has made it clear that Title VII protects against
discrimination beyond what the enacting Congress envisioned.281 Courts’
imperative to look beyond the original congressional intent of Title VII should
encourage different circuits to examine their comparative method jurisprudence
and logically expand it to cover sexual orientation discrimination. In fact, some
federal courts in other circuits have already reached the same conclusion as the
Seventh Circuit in Hively based on the comparative method.282 Additionally,
several federal courts in other circuits have noted the development in Hively and
have pointed out that en banc decisions in their circuits could reverse binding
precedent refusing to apply Title VII to LGBT discrimination claims.283 Because
of the logical use of the comparative method after Hopkins in these other circuits,
litigants should focus on arguing to these circuits that they should adopt the
application of the comparative method used by the Seventh Circuit in Hively.284
By matching this argument with one based on the associational method used by
the Seventh Circuit in Hively,285 litigants can assert persuasive rationales for
applying both sex stereotyping precedent and precedent on anti-miscegenation
to LGBT discrimination claims under Title VII.

277

Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291; Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).
City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d at 581.
279
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (noting that sexual orientation is a defining
piece of personal identity “central to individual dignity and autonomy”).
280
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
281
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
282
See Philpott v. New York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that sexual orientation
discrimination is actionable under Title VII); Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 269 (D.
Conn. 2016) (same); EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Penn. 2016) (same).
283
See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2017), rev’d en banc, 883 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir. 2018); Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Mgmt., LLC, No. 4:17CV2324 JCH, 2017 WL 6536576, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 21, 2017); Grimsley v. Am. Showa, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-24, 2017 WL 3605440, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
21, 2017); Burnett v. Union R.R., No. 17-101, 2017 WL 2731284, at *3 (W.D. Penn. June 26, 2017).
284
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
285
Id. at 347.
278
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B. The Associational Method in Other Federal Circuits
The associational method holds that when a person is discriminated against
because of the protected characteristic of someone she associates with, she is
actually being disadvantaged because of her own characteristics.286 The
associational method first arose out of Loving v. Virginia, in which the Supreme
Court held that anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because they drew distinctions based on race
despite punishing both white and black individuals in interracial marriages the
same.287 Based on Loving’s logic, several circuits have held that when an
employer discriminates against a person based on her association with members
of a certain race, she has been discriminated against based on her own race in
violation of Title VII.288 Arguably the same logic should apply to association
based on sex because Title VII treats each protected class “exactly the same.”289
The Seventh Circuit applied this logic in Hively to find that were the plaintiff a
man instead of a woman associating romantically with another woman, she
would not have faced the same discrimination.290 Since many other circuits
expressly apply the associational method with regards to race, the Court’s
command that Title VII protected classes be treated the same should serve as a
strong rationale for expanding the associational method to sex discrimination as
the Seventh Circuit did in Hively.
Although the dissent in Hively argued that Loving and Title VII associational
method cases are limited to racial discrimination claims because of the historical
difference between racial discrimination and sex discrimination,291 the dissent
does not acknowledge Hopkins’s command to treat protected classes “exactly

286

Id.
Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
288
See Floyd v. Amite Cty. Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d 244, 246–47, 249 (5th Cir. 2009) (Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on an African-American school principal’s association with white students);
Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (cognizable Title VII claim where plaintiff alleged
employer discriminated against him because of his participation in an interracial marriage); Tetro v. Elliott
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 990 (6th Cir. 1999) (cognizable Title
VII claim where plaintiff alleged employer terminated him because his child was biracial); Drake v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 883–84 (7th Cir. 1998) (cognizable Title VII claim where plaintiffs alleged
employer discriminated against them because of their association with African-American coworkers); Parr v.
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 1986) (cognizable Title VII claim where
plaintiff alleged employer discriminated against him because of his participation in an interracial marriage).
289
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243–44 n.9 (1989). The EEOC expressly adopted this
position to find that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal
No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6–7 (July 15, 2015).
290
Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
291
Id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
287
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the same” under Title VII.292 The dissent also argued that the proper way to
apply Title VII would be to determine whether the employer treated men who
are attracted to men the same way as it treated women who are attracted to
women.293 However, the Seventh Circuit noted that this reading applies a rule
that Loving explicitly rejected—namely that the dissent’s reading permits
discrimination against people based on their attraction to persons of the same
sex as long as the employer discriminates against all of its employees with samesex attraction the same.294 This is similar to the logic of historical antimiscegenation as it ignores the implicit line-drawing based on a protected
characteristic that must be made even when the discrimination applies equally
to both sexes. Thus, because other circuit precedent explicitly applies the
associational method to discrimination based on race and Hopkins commands
that protected classes under Title VII be treated the same, litigants should argue
in these other circuits that the logic of Loving and the associational method must
be applied the same to sex discrimination.
Strong bodies of binding law exist in other circuits that warrant those circuits
adopting Hively’s rationales for expanding Title VII. Based on the Supreme
Court’s expansion of Title VII in Hopkins,295 other circuits have used the
comparative method interpretively to extend Title VII to prohibit sex
stereotyping claims.296 Because LGBT discrimination is often inextricable from
sex stereotyping discrimination, litigants should focus on arguing in other
circuits that Title VII outright prohibits LGBT discrimination. Similarly, binding
law in other circuits applying Loving to prohibit associational race
discrimination under Title VII should apply with equal force to associational sex
discrimination because the Supreme Court has held that Title VII must be
applied to all its protected classes exactly the same. Because the Supreme Court
has at this point refused to resolve the circuit split created by Hively, LGBT
litigants have a unique opportunity to expand Hively’s rationales to other federal
circuits. Through this percolation, courts could expand Title VII’s protections to
more LGBT individuals geographically and provide the Supreme Court with
more persuasive logic and greater consensus, ultimately leading to a more solid
and informed resolution of the issue in favor of LGBT rights.

292
293
294
295
296

See generally id. at 348–49 (majority opinion); Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 243–44 n.9.
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
Id.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250.
See cases cited supra notes 276–78.
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C. Challenges and Alternatives to Expanding Title VII Through Federal
Courts
Until Hively, attempts to expand Title VII’s sex discrimination provision to
include sexual orientation through litigation were unsuccessful.297 Most courts
have rejected the sex discrimination argument either because they have treated
sex and sexual orientation as categorically different or because including sexual
orientation arguably contradicts congressional intent.298 Additionally, judges
often dismiss Title VII claims when the claimant is LGBT because of a fear that
LGBT claimants will try to bootstrap sexual orientation discrimination claims
under the sex discrimination provision, particularly when such judges are bound
by circuit precedent categorically excluding sexual orientation discrimination
claims under Title VII.299 These cases of early dismissal demonstrate the
challenges associated with expanding Title VII through litigation in federal
courts. Although some circuits may be poised to revisit the issue, given the
historical rejection of the Title VII sex discrimination argument, litigants and
activists should continue to consider alternative methods for expanding LGBT
antidiscrimination protections.
Congressional action to protect against LGBT discrimination is unlikely in
the current political climate.300 Further, in the face of public attacks, bias, and
opposition from the Trump administration, acceptance of LGBT people has
actually fallen for the first time in the United States.301 Given the bleak prospects
for passing federal legislation, aside from attempting to expand Title VII through
litigation, the next best option for expanding LGBT discrimination protections
is through state legislation. State law has historically led the charge for
discrimination protections for LGBT people, challenging the claim that the
federal government has always led in upholding civil rights.302 In fact, state
courts have created a body of precedent defining the scope and nuances of sexual
orientation discrimination that federal courts may be able to draw upon when
297
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reconsidering Title VII.303 Additionally, states like Texas and Indiana have
passed state-level RFRAs that expressly prevent claimants from using religious
freedom claims to avoid civil rights protections.304 Were activists to focus on
expanding LGBT discrimination protections through state law, these statutes
should serve as guideposts for ways to maximize both religious liberty and equal
protection under the law.
Relying on state law obviously presents many of the problems of
nonuniformity noted above.305 However, because of the historical reluctance of
federal courts to expand Title VII to include LGBT protections, state legislation
is worth considering as the next best avenue for geographically expanding
LGBT discrimination protections. By lobbying at the state level for
antidiscrimination statutes that include LGBT protections and by lobbying for
either adoption or amendment of state RFRAs to expressly include civil rights
carve-outs, state legislation serves as the next best and realistic avenue for
expanding LGBT discrimination protections aside from expansion of Title VII.

CONCLUSION
Hively represents a landmark victory in the fight for equal rights. The
Seventh Circuit’s decision arguably stands as the first step in dismantling the
current inequities based on “a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can
be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.”306 Hively is
particularly important at a time when religious freedom is wielded as a free
license to discriminate against LGBT people.307 This practice has led to a
conflict between two core American values—freedom of religion and equal
protection under the law.308 A confusing mélange of mismatched Supreme Court
precedent, nonuniform laws and policies, and disagreement among the federal
circuits begs the question of which value holds higher stock in the law.
After the successful fight for marriage equality, protection against
employment discrimination arguably represents the next frontier for LGBT
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rights.309 However, despite the important decision in Hively providing
employment discrimination protections to LGBT people under Title VII, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby threatens to allow private employers
to skirt Title VII’s protections by claiming religious objection to employing
LGBT individuals under RFRA. This Comment argues that RFRA will not allow
private employers to secure religious exemptions from Title VII to discriminate
against LGBT individuals because Title VII meets the strict scrutiny standard
imposed by RFRA.310 Further, reliance on Title VII provides other benefits—its
national scope obviates the need for LGBT individuals and multistate businesses
to rely on nonuniform state and local laws,311 and because some other important
federal antidiscrimination statutes are interpreted using Title VII case law,
expanding Hively’s rationales to these statutes could lead to sweeping LGBT
discrimination protections in areas like education, credit, and housing.312
Because these other statutes share similar language and a similar purpose, they
also meet RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard.313
Given these considerations, Title VII serves as the best defense against
LGBT discrimination on the basis of religious objection. This Comment
suggests the best strategy for maximizing the efficacy of Hively, particularly
after the Supreme Court refused to resolve the issue last Term, is for litigants to
extend Hively’s rationales to other federal circuits by encouraging them to take
a “fresh look,” relying on their existing bodies of case law.314 By expanding Title
VII in this way, litigants may extend Title VII’s protections to more of the LGBT
population and courts may develop contemporary opinions on Title VII
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, allowing the Court to eventually reach
a more informed decision in favor of LGBT rights.
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